"When Einstein claimed that “God doesn’t play dice,” he overlooked the causal power of dice. God not only plays dice but is, in fact, all the dice, tossing them—that is, Itself—in the right order and at the right time."
This certainly gives a whole new spin on Leibniz's "the best of all possible worlds".
Isn’t the assumption ‘mind is a non-physical substance’ itself problematic? Mind-substance should be amenable to mathematical representation to study its interaction with matter. It appears inconceivable how mind, with its ineffable beliefs, desires and intentions, could be captured in a mathematical formulation. There is no such difficulty with other ‘non-physical’ entities such as electromagnetic fields.
". . .a volition that rearranges the order of events to select one history from the countless possible ones." - So is this "rearranging Volition" (an arbitrary and random agent) a place holder for a primary first cause for everything?
"." . . God not only plays dice but is, in fact, all the dice, tossing them—that is, Itself" . . . — Isn't the previous statement somewhat of a tautology?
It isn't orthodox physicalism but it could be micropsychism, cosmopsychism, neutral monism, substance monism, or else. It is a matter of personal philosophical preference. Some classify Russelian moninsm as physicalism. But I don't feel this to be necessary. I like to call it a "libertarian panpsychist substance monism."
"When Einstein claimed that “God doesn’t play dice,” he overlooked the causal power of dice. God not only plays dice but is, in fact, all the dice, tossing them—that is, Itself—in the right order and at the right time."
This certainly gives a whole new spin on Leibniz's "the best of all possible worlds".
Oh...wow! I didn't know about this idea of Leibniz. This is worth a mention in some future writing. That's why we need philosophers! 😉
Ah yes, maybe philosophy is good for something after all! Maybe we should rename the Many Worlds Theory the Best of Many Possible Worlds Theory.
Isn’t the assumption ‘mind is a non-physical substance’ itself problematic? Mind-substance should be amenable to mathematical representation to study its interaction with matter. It appears inconceivable how mind, with its ineffable beliefs, desires and intentions, could be captured in a mathematical formulation. There is no such difficulty with other ‘non-physical’ entities such as electromagnetic fields.
". . .a volition that rearranges the order of events to select one history from the countless possible ones." - So is this "rearranging Volition" (an arbitrary and random agent) a place holder for a primary first cause for everything?
"." . . God not only plays dice but is, in fact, all the dice, tossing them—that is, Itself" . . . — Isn't the previous statement somewhat of a tautology?
Is this position panpsychist physicalism/Russelian monism?
It isn't orthodox physicalism but it could be micropsychism, cosmopsychism, neutral monism, substance monism, or else. It is a matter of personal philosophical preference. Some classify Russelian moninsm as physicalism. But I don't feel this to be necessary. I like to call it a "libertarian panpsychist substance monism."