I agree that a richer, more complex understanding of the nature of things is essential.
But there's a simple rebuttal to this:
"What is the evidence!? Why should one believe that there is anything beyond my body and my mind? Isn’t this wild speculation? Metaphysical phantasies? Show me the data!"
REBUTTAL
What is the evidence for a purely physical anything? Why should one believe that there is anything beyond perception or consciousness? Isn't this wild speculation? Metaphysical fantasy? Show me the data."
***
David Bentley Hart, in his "Vedantic/Christian" book "The Experience of God: Existence Consciousness Bliss" has provided one of the most articulate expressions of this rebuttal I've ever come across (and wonderfully, it doesn't require Bernardo Kastrup's call for "parsimony")
****
Excerpts from the book:
We have no actual direct experience of the material world as such at all, at least not as pure materialism depicts it. Our primordial experience of reality is an immediate perception of phenomena—appearances, that is—which come to us not directly through our senses, but through sensations as interpreted by thought, under the aspect of organizing eidetic patterns.
We do not encounter the material substrate of things, but only the intelligible forms of things, situated within an interdependent universe of intelligible forms, everywhere governed by purposes: organic, artificial, moral, aesthetic, social, and so forth. We know, also, that those forms are not simple structural aggregates of elementary physical realities, as if atoms were fixed components stacked one upon another like bricks until they added up to stable physical edifices; the forms remain constant, while atomic and subatomic reality is in perpetual flux and eludes that sort of local composition altogether.
Phenomenal forms and the quantum realm upon which they are superimposed do not constitute a simple, unilinear, mechanical continuum. And even in the purely physiological realm, we have no direct knowledge of unguided material forces simply spontaneously producing the complex order that constitutes our world.
A mere agitation of molecules, for instance, does not simply “amount to” a game of chess, even though every physical structure and activity involved in that game may be in one sense reducible without remainder to molecules and electrical impulses and so on; it is not the total ensemble of those material forces that adds up to the chess game, but only that ensemble as organized to an end by higher forms of causality.
Viewed from another and equally valid perspective, when one looks at that chess game one sees an immense and dynamic range of physical potentialities and actualities assumed into a complex unity by the imposition of rational form. One sees a variety of causalities, from below and from above, perfectly integrated and inseparable, and none obviously sufficient in itself to account for the whole.
We do not actually have an immediate knowledge of the material order in itself but know only its phenomenal aspects, by which our minds organize our sensory experiences. Even “matter” is only a general concept and must be imposed upon the data of the senses in order for us to interpret them as experiences of any particular kind of reality (that is, material rather than, say, mental).
More to the point, any logical connection we might imagine to exist between empirical experience of the material order and the ideology of scientific naturalism is entirely illusory. Between our sensory impressions and the abstract concept of a causally closed and autonomous order called “nature” there is no necessary correlation whatsoever. Such a concept may determine how we think about our sensory impressions, but those impressions cannot in turn provide any evidence in favor of that concept. Neither can anything else.
We have no immediate experience of pure nature as such, nor any coherent notion of what such a thing might be. The object has never appeared. No such phenomenon has ever been observed or experienced or cogently imagined.
Once again: We cannot encounter the world without encountering at the same time the being of the world, which is a mystery that can never be dispelled by any physical explanation of reality, inasmuch as it is a mystery logically prior to and in excess of the physical order.
We cannot encounter the world, furthermore, except in the luminous medium of intentional and unified consciousness, which defies every reduction to purely physiological causes, but which also clearly corresponds to an essential intelligibility in being itself. We cannot encounter the world, finally, except through our conscious and intentional orientation toward the absolute, in pursuit of a final bliss that beckons to us from within those transcendental desires that constitute the very structure of rational thought, and that open all of reality to us precisely by bearing us on toward ends that lie beyond the totality of physical things.
The whole of nature is something prepared for us, composed for us, given to us, delivered into our care by a “supernatural” dispensation. All this being so, one might plausibly say that God—the infinite wellspring of being, consciousness, and bliss that is the source, order, and end of all reality—is evident everywhere, inescapably present to us, while autonomous “nature” is something that has never, even for a moment, come into view. Pure nature is an unnatural concept.
Ok, I just looked at it again and if you take away the last paragraph, everything I see seems to me a perfectly obvious, logical statement.
Is there something specific you think wouldn’t appropriately address the dualist (I mean, not including the last paragraph)?
Perhaps the words about intelligibility? Maybe that seems out of place because we’ve become so used to the physicalist view that things just sort of magically happen because of alleged laws of nature, rather than realizing that suggesting that order occurs because of order is an unintelligible statement (which, it seems to me, is one of the main points Hart is making).
Really? Hart sees himself as writing philosophy of mind. He mentions God toward the end, but the key point I thought is that we have no evidence of the dualist’s (or physicalist’s) notion of matter.
So why take either the physicalist or dualist seriously if they can’t provide any evidence of the physical stuff they claim is either fundamental or one half of whatever is fundamental to reality?
I still see this as the very first starting point in any discussion of physicalism or dualism? Seems to me the burden of evidence is on them, otherwise, there’s no basis for their claims and no reason to discuss.
Only partially. Because, with the same rationale we can say that one can't provide any evidence for the mind, vital, and subconscient stuff either. And even all rungs of the ladder of the supraconscious (maybe only the last one we can say is "God"). From the highest standpoint there is no proof of anything other than movements of consciousness in consciousness (and even that is doubtful since such an idea implies a dynamical change that isn't proper to consciousness.) Even our personality doesn't exists. It is juts a thought. The universe is also a Thought. We have no immediate knowledge of all these things other than as forms of phenomenal events in consciousness. That's all true. But I don't see this as a "first starting point in any discussion of physicalism or dualism." It distracts the attention from seeing our nature integrally.
It's funny, even though I often preface this by suggesting we start with an agnostic point of view, people almost always answer "you can't provide evidence for mind, etc.'
But actually, even taking a purely agnostic view, it's radically different:
1. We have no evidence for anything purely material.
2. We have direct evidence for mind, defined as awareness of experience.
So ONLY talking in terms of a starting point for talking about things like vital, subconscious, superconscious, the point is to clarify: If you want to have a conversation about, say, just vital energy, and you want to start ANYWHERE except from experience, you have to first provide some evidence for something purely material. If you can't, then there's no point in talking about materialism or dualism, since (1) there's no evidence for it; and (2) in order to explain anything, it's not just useless, it makes the existence of anything impossible.
This is both Hart's and Bernardo's starting point. whatever you think of Bernardo, I think Hart's reasoning (in the above passages, if you look again) is irrefutable.
Again, of course there's no proof of the existence of anything non physical in the scientific sense, from the 3rd person perspective. But there's no proof of the existence of anything from the 3rd person perspective. All 3rd person reports begin with the first person.
The materialist and dualist demonstrate complete philosophic ignorance when they imply they have scientific evidence at least for anything purely material (in the sense the materialist means). They don't. They can't. It's impossible.
So if you're having a philosophic discussion, and want to talk about vital energy, and the materialist says "pure matter can account for everything," it seems the simplest, most reasonable thing to ask is, "Why should I believe in such "pure matter?"
And if the dualist says, "Ok, I'll accept vital energy, but only if it is accompanied by pure matter," once again it seems like before one even begins to talk, one should ask, "What is this pure matter? If you can't define it, and there's no evidence for it, and imagining such a thing exists (even though it's really impossible to even imagine it except in a kind of self refuting, purely abstract manner) why should we bring it into the discussion?
I think I should have said, "there's no proof of the existence of anything from the PURELY 3rd person perspective."
We always forget the 3rd person relies, is based on, an initial first person account (this is, I think what Anton Zeilinger was referring to when he pointed out we ALWAYS start with perception, not with stand alone matter)
Then we act as if the 3rd person perspective (which is all that physical or material stuff is) is independent.
Maybe that's the simplest summary. There is NO purely 3rd person perspective.
This is, I think what Sri Aurobindo meant, in quite a mainstream way of thinking, not at all superconscious or supramental, when he said the idea of something purely physical or purely material is a "nightmare, a phantasmagoria."
In what sense is the mind as experience more real than matter as experience? Both are awareness of something. The bodily sensations that construct the concept of what we call “matter” are no more or less real than the emotional sensation, and mental sensations. After all, this is the reason why we have no idea what “non-physical” or the distinction between “physical” vs. “non-physical” could possibly mean. And precisely for this reason I agree that "there's no proof of the existence of anything from the PURELY 3rd person perspective." I don’t see any contradiction with Hart or Kastrup. While, it sounds as if you believe that mind or vital energies have some higher ontological status than matter. Both are events on the screen of consciousness.
I agree that a richer, more complex understanding of the nature of things is essential.
But there's a simple rebuttal to this:
"What is the evidence!? Why should one believe that there is anything beyond my body and my mind? Isn’t this wild speculation? Metaphysical phantasies? Show me the data!"
REBUTTAL
What is the evidence for a purely physical anything? Why should one believe that there is anything beyond perception or consciousness? Isn't this wild speculation? Metaphysical fantasy? Show me the data."
***
David Bentley Hart, in his "Vedantic/Christian" book "The Experience of God: Existence Consciousness Bliss" has provided one of the most articulate expressions of this rebuttal I've ever come across (and wonderfully, it doesn't require Bernardo Kastrup's call for "parsimony")
****
Excerpts from the book:
We have no actual direct experience of the material world as such at all, at least not as pure materialism depicts it. Our primordial experience of reality is an immediate perception of phenomena—appearances, that is—which come to us not directly through our senses, but through sensations as interpreted by thought, under the aspect of organizing eidetic patterns.
We do not encounter the material substrate of things, but only the intelligible forms of things, situated within an interdependent universe of intelligible forms, everywhere governed by purposes: organic, artificial, moral, aesthetic, social, and so forth. We know, also, that those forms are not simple structural aggregates of elementary physical realities, as if atoms were fixed components stacked one upon another like bricks until they added up to stable physical edifices; the forms remain constant, while atomic and subatomic reality is in perpetual flux and eludes that sort of local composition altogether.
Phenomenal forms and the quantum realm upon which they are superimposed do not constitute a simple, unilinear, mechanical continuum. And even in the purely physiological realm, we have no direct knowledge of unguided material forces simply spontaneously producing the complex order that constitutes our world.
A mere agitation of molecules, for instance, does not simply “amount to” a game of chess, even though every physical structure and activity involved in that game may be in one sense reducible without remainder to molecules and electrical impulses and so on; it is not the total ensemble of those material forces that adds up to the chess game, but only that ensemble as organized to an end by higher forms of causality.
Viewed from another and equally valid perspective, when one looks at that chess game one sees an immense and dynamic range of physical potentialities and actualities assumed into a complex unity by the imposition of rational form. One sees a variety of causalities, from below and from above, perfectly integrated and inseparable, and none obviously sufficient in itself to account for the whole.
We do not actually have an immediate knowledge of the material order in itself but know only its phenomenal aspects, by which our minds organize our sensory experiences. Even “matter” is only a general concept and must be imposed upon the data of the senses in order for us to interpret them as experiences of any particular kind of reality (that is, material rather than, say, mental).
More to the point, any logical connection we might imagine to exist between empirical experience of the material order and the ideology of scientific naturalism is entirely illusory. Between our sensory impressions and the abstract concept of a causally closed and autonomous order called “nature” there is no necessary correlation whatsoever. Such a concept may determine how we think about our sensory impressions, but those impressions cannot in turn provide any evidence in favor of that concept. Neither can anything else.
We have no immediate experience of pure nature as such, nor any coherent notion of what such a thing might be. The object has never appeared. No such phenomenon has ever been observed or experienced or cogently imagined.
Once again: We cannot encounter the world without encountering at the same time the being of the world, which is a mystery that can never be dispelled by any physical explanation of reality, inasmuch as it is a mystery logically prior to and in excess of the physical order.
We cannot encounter the world, furthermore, except in the luminous medium of intentional and unified consciousness, which defies every reduction to purely physiological causes, but which also clearly corresponds to an essential intelligibility in being itself. We cannot encounter the world, finally, except through our conscious and intentional orientation toward the absolute, in pursuit of a final bliss that beckons to us from within those transcendental desires that constitute the very structure of rational thought, and that open all of reality to us precisely by bearing us on toward ends that lie beyond the totality of physical things.
The whole of nature is something prepared for us, composed for us, given to us, delivered into our care by a “supernatural” dispensation. All this being so, one might plausibly say that God—the infinite wellspring of being, consciousness, and bliss that is the source, order, and end of all reality—is evident everywhere, inescapably present to us, while autonomous “nature” is something that has never, even for a moment, come into view. Pure nature is an unnatural concept.
Yes, but that sounds to me as the rebuttal of the Vedantin. It has its value and its place, but not in the context of this post.
Ok, I just looked at it again and if you take away the last paragraph, everything I see seems to me a perfectly obvious, logical statement.
Is there something specific you think wouldn’t appropriately address the dualist (I mean, not including the last paragraph)?
Perhaps the words about intelligibility? Maybe that seems out of place because we’ve become so used to the physicalist view that things just sort of magically happen because of alleged laws of nature, rather than realizing that suggesting that order occurs because of order is an unintelligible statement (which, it seems to me, is one of the main points Hart is making).
Really? Hart sees himself as writing philosophy of mind. He mentions God toward the end, but the key point I thought is that we have no evidence of the dualist’s (or physicalist’s) notion of matter.
So why take either the physicalist or dualist seriously if they can’t provide any evidence of the physical stuff they claim is either fundamental or one half of whatever is fundamental to reality?
I still see this as the very first starting point in any discussion of physicalism or dualism? Seems to me the burden of evidence is on them, otherwise, there’s no basis for their claims and no reason to discuss.
Does that not make sense?
Only partially. Because, with the same rationale we can say that one can't provide any evidence for the mind, vital, and subconscient stuff either. And even all rungs of the ladder of the supraconscious (maybe only the last one we can say is "God"). From the highest standpoint there is no proof of anything other than movements of consciousness in consciousness (and even that is doubtful since such an idea implies a dynamical change that isn't proper to consciousness.) Even our personality doesn't exists. It is juts a thought. The universe is also a Thought. We have no immediate knowledge of all these things other than as forms of phenomenal events in consciousness. That's all true. But I don't see this as a "first starting point in any discussion of physicalism or dualism." It distracts the attention from seeing our nature integrally.
It's funny, even though I often preface this by suggesting we start with an agnostic point of view, people almost always answer "you can't provide evidence for mind, etc.'
But actually, even taking a purely agnostic view, it's radically different:
1. We have no evidence for anything purely material.
2. We have direct evidence for mind, defined as awareness of experience.
So ONLY talking in terms of a starting point for talking about things like vital, subconscious, superconscious, the point is to clarify: If you want to have a conversation about, say, just vital energy, and you want to start ANYWHERE except from experience, you have to first provide some evidence for something purely material. If you can't, then there's no point in talking about materialism or dualism, since (1) there's no evidence for it; and (2) in order to explain anything, it's not just useless, it makes the existence of anything impossible.
This is both Hart's and Bernardo's starting point. whatever you think of Bernardo, I think Hart's reasoning (in the above passages, if you look again) is irrefutable.
Again, of course there's no proof of the existence of anything non physical in the scientific sense, from the 3rd person perspective. But there's no proof of the existence of anything from the 3rd person perspective. All 3rd person reports begin with the first person.
The materialist and dualist demonstrate complete philosophic ignorance when they imply they have scientific evidence at least for anything purely material (in the sense the materialist means). They don't. They can't. It's impossible.
So if you're having a philosophic discussion, and want to talk about vital energy, and the materialist says "pure matter can account for everything," it seems the simplest, most reasonable thing to ask is, "Why should I believe in such "pure matter?"
And if the dualist says, "Ok, I'll accept vital energy, but only if it is accompanied by pure matter," once again it seems like before one even begins to talk, one should ask, "What is this pure matter? If you can't define it, and there's no evidence for it, and imagining such a thing exists (even though it's really impossible to even imagine it except in a kind of self refuting, purely abstract manner) why should we bring it into the discussion?
What is wrong with Hart's reasoning here?
I think I should have said, "there's no proof of the existence of anything from the PURELY 3rd person perspective."
We always forget the 3rd person relies, is based on, an initial first person account (this is, I think what Anton Zeilinger was referring to when he pointed out we ALWAYS start with perception, not with stand alone matter)
Then we act as if the 3rd person perspective (which is all that physical or material stuff is) is independent.
Maybe that's the simplest summary. There is NO purely 3rd person perspective.
This is, I think what Sri Aurobindo meant, in quite a mainstream way of thinking, not at all superconscious or supramental, when he said the idea of something purely physical or purely material is a "nightmare, a phantasmagoria."
In what sense is the mind as experience more real than matter as experience? Both are awareness of something. The bodily sensations that construct the concept of what we call “matter” are no more or less real than the emotional sensation, and mental sensations. After all, this is the reason why we have no idea what “non-physical” or the distinction between “physical” vs. “non-physical” could possibly mean. And precisely for this reason I agree that "there's no proof of the existence of anything from the PURELY 3rd person perspective." I don’t see any contradiction with Hart or Kastrup. While, it sounds as if you believe that mind or vital energies have some higher ontological status than matter. Both are events on the screen of consciousness.